- Per goal: pass
egress_allowlistwhen you create the goal. Setting it, even to[], limits every sandbox of that goal. - Per organization: an admin turns on default-deny with
PUT /v1/org/sandbox-egress{ "default_deny": true }. Every sandbox of its goals is then limited.
What is enforced
The network filter denies every connection except OneShot’s API and the listed hosts. Its limits:- Hostnames are matched on the HTTP
Hostheader (port 80) and the TLS server name (port 443); for other ports, list an address or range. - A hostname on a shared CDN endpoint may expose other sites served there.
- No DNS server is reachable. A resolver inside the sandbox answers only the listed names and refuses every other lookup; a query sent straight to
8.8.8.8is denied by the filter. - An allowlisted address range that contains a public resolver reopens DNS to it, unrecorded: allow rules win over deny rules.
- Only IPv4 is filtered.
Blocked attempts
Each reported attempt is oneegress_blocked goal event and one compute.egress_blocked entry in the organization’s audit log, under Policies: goal, sandbox, destination and time.
source: dns_refused: a lookup of a name outside the allowlist, refused and recorded by the resolver whatever program made it and however it exited. The runtime reports it after every tool call and at exit; the agent loop after every command, on pause and on end.source: command_failure: a connection to an address outside the allowlist. The network filter denies it without a log, so it is recorded only when a finished command’s output shows the failure, with the host when named.
OneShot tools the sandbox calls (web read, search, browser, email) run outside it and are not limited.
API
Both return
{ success: true, data: { default_deny } }. Each change is an org.sandbox_egress_changed audit entry.